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Abstract—We present a secret key agreement (SKA) protocol
for a multi-user time-division duplex system where a base-station
(BS) with a large antenna array (LAA) shares secret keys with
users in the presence of non-colluding eavesdroppers. In the
system, when the BS transmits random sequences to legitimate
users for sharing common randomness, the eavesdroppers can
attempt the pilot contamination attack (PCA) in which each of
eavesdroppers transmits its target user’s training sequence in
hopes of acquiring possible information leak by steering beam
towards the eavesdropper. We show that there exists a crucial
complementary relation between the received signal strengths at
the eavesdropper and its target user. This relation tells us that the
eavesdropper inevitably leaves a trace that enables us to devise
a way of measuring the amount of information leakage to the
eavesdropper even if PCA parameters are unknown. To this end,
we derive an estimator for the channel gain from the BS to the
eavesdropper and propose a rate-adaptation scheme for adjusting
the length of secret key under the PCA. Extensive analysis and
evaluations are carried out under various setups, which show that
the proposed scheme adequately takes advantage of the LAA to
establish the secret keys under the PCA.
Index Terms—Channel estimation, information leakage, large
antenna arrays, multi-user, pilot contamination attack, secret key
generation, time division duplex.
I. INTRODUCTION
The broadcast nature of wireless medium makes wire-
less communications especially vulnerable to various security
threats such as eavesdropping, impersonating, and message
modification. However, by establishing secret keys between
legitimate terminals through a secret-key agreement (SKA)
protocol, such threats can be efficiently nullified. To this
end, information theoretic approaches [1]–[5] for the SKA
have been proposed and extensively studied. In [1], Wyner
considered a scenario called the wiretap channel in which an
eavesdropper listens in on communications between legitimate
terminals over a noisier channel than the one between legit-
imate terminals. In the seminar work, it was shown that a
pair of legitimate terminals can share a secret key in total
ignorance of the eavesdropper with group codes. Later, Csiz´ar
and Ko¨rner [3] generalized the Wyner’s original work in [1].
Motivated by the results, a great deal of research has been
conducted on SKA over various types of wiretap channels [6]–
[10]. However, such SKA schemes seem impractical as most
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of studies on code design for wiretap channels are limited to
the cases with asymptotically long block lengths [11]–[13] and
the assumption of noisier eavesdropper’s channel may not be
guaranteed in many cases. In addition, to determine secrecy
rates, eavesdropper’s channel quality and/or statistics must be
a priori known.
Meanwhile, it was shown in [4] that a secret key can
be shared with public discussion even if an eavesdropper
has a better channel provided the legitimate terminals have
knowledge of the eavesdropper’s channel quality. In addition,
a practical sequential SKA protocol was introduced by Maurer.
The scheme is designed to sequentially perform the following
three phases: the advantage distillation [4], information recon-
ciliation [14], and privacy amplification [15] phases. The first
phase, i.e. the advantage distillation, enables the legitimate
terminals to share correlated random sequences with a higher
correlation than the one an eavesdropper acquires even under
the condition that neither of the legitimate terminals has
an advantage compared to the eavesdropper. In the infor-
mation reconciliation phase, the legitimate terminals make
their correlated random sequences identical by exchanging
information over public channel. Finally, each legitimate ter-
minal independently performs the privacy amplification on the
identical random sequence to generate a secret key which the
eavesdropper is completely ignorant of. The SKA scheme is
adopted in the quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol [16],
[17] in which the quantum entanglement is utilized to detect
possible eavesdropping of the randomness sharing between
two legitimate terminals. Due to the inherent advantage com-
pared to the eavesdropper, the randomness sharing in the QKD
protocol can be performed without the advantage distillation
phase. After the randomness sharing, the protocol performs
the information reconciliation and the privacy amplification.
Meanwhile, in wireless communications, there have been a few
notable efforts [18]–[20] to realize the randomness sharing by
exploiting wireless channel reciprocity.
Recently, cellular systems with large antenna arrays
(LAAs1) have been extensively studied due to their attractive
features [21]–[26]. On one hand, a high spectral efficiency
can be achievable since small-scale fading and intra-cell
interference can be efficiently mitigated by the LAA [21]–
[23]. On the other hand, from a security point of view, the
LAA is especially advantageous in the sense that a narrower
beam formed by the LAA makes the reception at the passive
1By the LAA, we mean a BS’s antenna array of a number of antenna
elements and this number is usually much larger than that of users in the cell
under the service of the BS.
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2eavesdropper significantly weakened. Thus, the secrecy rate
of wiretap LAA channels grows with the number of transmit
antennas [24]–[28]. Sum secrecy rates in multi-user MIMO
system have been studied in [27]. Then, the research is
further extended to a multi-cell setup [28]. These studies show
that the LAA helps wireless systems to have an advantage
over eavesdroppers, which is equivalent to performing the
advantage distillation phase [29] in the randomness sharing.
This work considers an SKA protocol for the system with
LAA based on the sequential three-phase protocol. In partic-
ular, the randomness sharing is carried out in such a way that
the base-station (BS) first acquires a collection of channel state
information (CSI) between the BS and the multiple users from
the receptions of orthogonal training sequences simultaneously
sent by the users during a fraction of coherence block. Then,
the channel reciprocity [30] enables the BS to make a precod-
ing vector for the subsequent downlink data transmission to
each of users equipped with a single receive antenna. The BS
transmits different random sequences weighted by precoding
vectors to the legitimate users during the remaining fraction
of the coherence time. The time-division duplex (TDD) mode
significantly reduces the channel estimation overhead [21].
In this work, we assume that uncoded random sequences
are transmitted and allows some errors to happen over the
transmissions. After the downlink transmissions, the BS and
users end up having correlated random sequences that are not
necessarily identical due to possible errors in the received
random sequences. However, the advantage associated with
LAA enables the shared random sequences between the BS
and legitimate users to have higher correlations than the ones at
the passive eavesdroppers when the number of antennas at the
BS is sufficiently large. Thus, by performing the subsequent
information reconciliation and privacy amplification phases,
the BS and users can have identical secret keys in the end.
The key agreement protocol we consider in this work can be
understood within the theoretical framework of sender excited
model [31], [32].
However, recently, a serious security weakness of the SKA
protocol was discussed by Zhou et al in [33] where it was
pointed out that the precoding for legitimate users in the LAA-
based TDD system is solely determined by CSI estimates
based on the uplink training sequences which are exposed to
active attacks. As a potential attack, the authors in [33] studied
an active eavesdropping attack called pilot contamination
attack (PCA) in which an eavesdropper transmits the same
pilot sequence as the one from a target user for the purpose
of tilting the direction of beam towards the eavesdroppers.
In particular, by contaminating the pilot sequence, the eaves-
dropper deceives the BS to make a precoding vector which
steers the beam direction from the target user towards the
eavesdropper, and the information sent by the BS leaks to
the eavesdropper. Since the PCA was first introduced in [33],
countermeasures to protect wireless communications from the
PCA have not been well investigated, which motives our work.
There have been efforts to detect the PCA in [26], [34] among
which the authors in [26] studied a PCA detector and an
estimator of the eavesdropper’s channel. While the detector
utilizes statistics of the received signals at both BS and the
target user, the estimator is based only on the ones at the BS
side. Meanwhile, the work in [34] proposed a PCA detection
technique which employs random pilots from a set of phase-
shift keying symbols. In [35], an SKA protocol under potential
PCA was proposed and evaluated. However, the SKA protocol
in [35] is inefficient in the sense that the protocol requires
multiple coherence blocks and simply discards suspicious
packets.
In this paper, based on the three-phase sequential protocol
we propose a modified SKA protocol tailored for nullifying
the PCA with assumptions: 1) multiple non-colluding eaves-
droppers equipped with a single antenna attempt the PCA to
their own targets [36]–[38], 2) the BS and legitimate users do
not have any prior knowledge of the eavesdroppers such as the
number of eavesdroppers in the network, their locations, and
their transmit powers used in the PCA, and 3) other cells fully
cooperate in a way not to use the training sequences of the
users in the process of SKA. Thus, the pilot contaminations
to the users in the SKA process come only from the active
eavesdroppers employing the PCA if any. The cooperation
with other cells can be justified since the SKA session needs to
be rarely performed as compared to data transmission. Thus,
the system throughput degradation due to the cooperation
could be negligible.
The sequential SKA protocol enables us to establish a secret
key between legitimate parities even under the PCA if the SKA
scheme has knowledge of how much information the active
eavesdroppers have gained about the random sequences trans-
mitted by the BS. However, unfortunately, such knowledge is
not available. To overcome the technical challenge, the stan-
dard sequential SKA protocol must be modified by introducing
a mechanism to estimate the amount of information leakage.
The main idea of the proposed SKA is inspired by the QKD
protocol [39]–[41]. The security of QKD is based on the prin-
ciples of quantum mechanics, the no-cloning theorem [42] for
example, implying that eavesdropper cannot overhear qubits
transmitted from a transmitter to a receiver without introducing
detectable anomalies. In the protocol BB84 [39], the legitimate
terminals discuss a certain subset of their measurement results
to detect the presence of eavesdropping. When eavesdropping
is detected, the random sequence obtained from this session
is discarded. We find that the wireless system with LAA has
a similar property with which the presence of eavesdropper
can be detected. That is, there is a complementary relation
between the received signal strengths at the target user and
eavesdropper. Once an eavesdropper attempts the PCA on
a target user, the received signal strength at the target user
becomes weaker than the one expected since the beam formed
by the BS for the target user is partially steered towards
the eavesdropper. Thus, the stronger the PCA, the wider gap
between the signal strength measured at the target user and
the one expected. In this paper, based on this relation, we
derive an estimator to measure the CSI between the BS and
eavesdroppers since the CSI is directly proportional to the
amount of the information leakage. Then, the BS and the
legitimate users can adjust the lengths of secret keys according
to the estimated amount of information leakage contrary to
the protocol BB84 [39] where the generated secret keys are
3discarded when eavesdropping is suspicious. Performances of
the proposed scheme are evaluated by conducting comparisons
in numerical and analytic ways in various environments. The
main contributions of this paper is summarized as follows:
1) We first introduce the proposed SKA protocol to defend
wireless systems with LAA against the PCA. The impact
of the PCA on the performance of the SKA scheme
is analyzed in terms of average signal-to-interference-
plus-noise power ratios (SINRs) at the target user and
eavesdropper. The analysis results clearly show the com-
plementary relation between the average SINRs at the
target user and eavesdropper.
2) Based on the complementary relation, we derive an es-
timator for the purpose of estimating the eavesdroppers’
channels, i.e. the ones between the BS and eavesdrop-
pers. It will be shown that the estimation results can
be utilized for estimating the amount of information
leakage during the randomness sharing.
3) We evaluate average secret key lengths when the esti-
mate of information leakage is provided to the sequential
SKA protocol which adaptively determines the length
of resulting secret key. Performance evaluations show
that the secrecy outage probability, i.e. the probability
not to achieve perfect secrecy, decreases exponentially
fast with the number of antennas. In addition, it will
be shown that a stronger PCA ironically results in a
better system performance, i.e. a lower secrecy outage
probability due to the complementary relation.
4) Comprehensive performance evaluations are carried out
to see trade-offs between the outage probability and
average secret key length with different combinations
of system parameters, such as the number of users,
the number of antennas at the BS, and the lengths of
random sequences. The results of performance evalua-
tions enable the system designer to choose appropriate
parameters to meet various system requirements.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we describe the scenario under investigation which includes
the proposed SKA protocol, an adversary model, and channel
models. In Section III, the complementary relation of the
received signal strengths is analyzed by investigating average
SINRs at the legitimate user and eavesdropper. Based on the
relation, an estimation scheme for the amount of information
leakage to eavesdropper is proposed and analyzed. In Sec-
tion IV, performance evaluations for the proposed estimation
scheme are carried out in terms of a normalized mean-square
error. In addition, the secrecy outage probability and the
average length of secret key are extensively evaluated with
various combinations of design parameters. Finally, we make
conclusions in Section V.
Notation: Bold face upper and lower case letters are used
to denote matrices and vectors, respectively. Transpose and
Hermitian are denoted by (·)T and (·)†, respectively. We
use [x]+ for max{0, x}. 0M and IM denote the M × 1 all
zero vector and M × M identity matrix, respectively. We
use ‖·‖ for the Euclidean vector norm. A probability density
function (pdf) and a conditional pdf are denoted by f(·) and
f(·|·), respectively. When the pdf and the conditional pdf are
parameterized by an unknown parameter θ, they are denoted
by f(·; θ) and f(·|·; θ), respectively.
II. SECRET KEY AGREEMENT SCHEME
A. System model
We consider a TDD-based cellular system where a base
station in each cell, called Alice, aims at establishing different
secret keys with K legitimate users in the presence of Ke
active eavesdroppers. Alice has an array of a large number
of antennas, say M antennas, while each of K users has
a single antenna. Fig. 1(a) illustrates an example where the
k-th legitimate user is in the SKA session over a wireless
channel, and the `k-th eavesdropper attempts the PCA to the
k-th legitimate user over a different wireless channel.
The wireless channels in this work experience both small-
scale and large-scale fading. In Fig. 1(a), the channel realiza-
tion at the j-th coherence block between Alice and the k-th
user is given by
√
βk,jhk,j . Here,
√
βk,j accounts for the
nonnegative large-scale fading factor determined by path-loss
and shadowing, which are slowly varying over time, while hk,j
is an M × 1 vector representing the small-scale fading and
varying faster than the large-scale fading factors. We assume
that the large-scale fading factors,
√
βk,j’s for 1 ≤ k ≤ K
are public information a priori known to everyone including
eavesdroppers. Meanwhile, it is assumed that the small-scale
fading factor, hk,j’s follow CN (0M , IM ) and are statistically
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). In addition,
we assume block fading channels, i.e. hk,j’s are static over
a coherence block and i.i.d. across coherence blocks. The
proposed SKA protocol is performed within one coherence
block, and thus we will omit the coherence block index j for
simplicity throughout this paper. Contrary to the large scaling
fading factors, only the statistical properties of the small scale
fading factors are known to everyone. Thus, each realization
of hk is unknown and must be estimated if needed. Similarly,
the wireless channels between Alice and the eavesdroppers
are modeled as
√
βe`h
e
` , ` ∈ {1, . . . ,Ke}, where
√
βe` and h
e
`
are the large- and small-scale fading factors, respectively. Note
that the coherence block index j is omitted as aforementioned.
Contrary to the legitimate users’ channels, it is assumed that
the large scaling fading factors βe` is known only to the
eavesdroppers, i.e. not available to the legitimate users and
Alice.
For the cellular system, we consider the proposed SKA
protocol summarized in Fig. 1(b), which consists of common
randomness sharing, information reconciliation, information
leakage estimation and privacy amplifications. In this section,
the building blocks of the proposed scheme in Fig. 1(b)
are introduced in detail except for the information leakage
estimation which will be discussed in Section III.
B. Common Randomness Sharing (CRS)
1) Uplink Training: The CRS is initiated by users who want
to establish secret keys. As the first step of the CRS, K users
simultaneously transmit orthonormal training sequences at the
beginning of a coherence block so that Alice can estimate
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Fig. 1. System model
CSI of each user, i.e. hk. In particular, the legitimate users
transmit
√
puNuψk to Alice, where pu is the uplink training
power, ψk is a 1×Nu binary orthonormal training sequence,
i.e. ψkψ
†
k = 1, ψkψ
†
` = 0 for k 6= `, and k and ` are in
K = {1, 2, . . . ,K}. Here, Nu (i.e., the length of orthonormal
training sequences) is usually larger than or equal to K.
Meanwhile, for the PCA, the eavesdroppers inject their
target users’ training sequences perfectly synchronized with
the uplink training sequences originated from the legitimate
users. Then, the received signal at Alice becomes
Y =
∑
k∈K
√
puβkNuhkψk +
∑
`∈E
√
pe`β
e
`Nuh
e
`ψ` + U, (1)
where E = {1, . . . ,Ke} is the index set of eavesdroppers, pe`
is the PCA power of the `-th eavesdropper, U is an M ×
Nu noise matrix in which each entry is independent zero-
mean circularly-symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG) with
unit variance.
Since we assume multiple non-colluding eavesdroppers in
a cell, it is conceivable that multiple eavesdroppers may
perform the PCA to a target user. This is however of no
benefit to the non-colluding eavesdroppers since they are in a
competition to pull the user beam towards them, and thereby
the amount of information leaked to each eavesdropper de-
creases. Furthermore, if an eavesdropper performs the PCA on
multiple users simultaneously, it will receive a superposition of
multiple signals and its eavesdropping performance becomes
interference-limited as when a signal to a user is to be detected
or decoded, the other signals (to the other users) become
interfering signals.
Thus, throughout this paper, we consider the best case
scenario for eavesdroppers as follows:
• An eavesdropper does not attempt the PCA targeting
more than one user at a time, and
• A user is not targeted by more than one eavesdropper at
a time.
The assumptions guarantee that there are at most K eavesdrop-
pers in a cell, i.e. Ke ≤ K, and each of them has its unique
target. In this work, without loss of generality, we assume that
K = E , i.e. Ke = K and the k-th legitimate user is attacked
by the k-th eavesdropper. Hereafter, the k-th user and the k-th
eavesdropper are called Bob and Eve for short when there is
no risk of confusion.
Since Alice does not know the CSI for the legitimate users,
she has to estimate the CSI based on the received signal, Y.
Due to the orthonormality, yk = Yψ
†
k is a sufficient statistic
for estimating the CSI for Bob, i.e. hk, which is expressed as
yk =
√
ck(hk + wkh
e
k) + uk, for k ∈ K, (2)
where ck = puβkNu, uk = Uψ
†
k, and
wk =
√
pekβ
e
k
puβk
, for k ∈ K. (3)
In (3), wk ∈ [0,∞)2 represents the effective strength of the
PCA to Bob, and the case of wk = 0 implies passive eaves-
dropping. We employ a minimum mean-square-error (MSE),
or MMSE estimator to estimate hk [43], [44] which is
hˆk =
√
ck
1 + (1 + w2k) ck
yk. (4)
Note that the estimator in (4) requires the knowledge of wk
that is, however, not available to Alice. Thus, when Alice is
not aware of the PCA, she has the estimate, hˆk in (4) with
wk = 0, which becomes
hˆk = yk
√
ck/(1 + ck).
2We exclude wk > 1 since an eavesdropper considered in this paper aims
to eavesdrop a secret key between Alice and a target without revealing its
presence. Nevertheless, the eavesdropper may increase its uplink training
power by wk > 1. In this case, the attack can be detected by the target
user immediately [26], and Alice and the target user can avoid such an attack
by establishing a new wireless channel to generate a secret key.
52) Downlink Transmission: In the downlink transmission,
Alice generates K binary random sequences of length Nb,
denoted by bk = [bk,1, . . . , bk,Nb ]
T for k ∈ K, which are
then mapped into a modulated sequence of length Nd, denoted
by qk = [qk,1, . . . , qk,Nd ]
T , where qk,j ∈ C, 1 ≤ j ≤ Nd.
Alice simultaneously sends qk weighted by precoding vectors
in the form of
√
pd
∑K
k=1 akq
T
k for all k ∈ K, where pd is the
downlink transmission power, and ak is an M × 1 precoding
vector for Bob. The average power of qk is normalized to be
1
Nd
E[||qk||2] = 1. The precoding vector ak is determined as
a function of hˆk, i.e ak = ϕ(hˆk) where ϕ(·) is a precoding
vector generating function that could be chosen in different
ways. In this paper, we consider the matched filter (MF)
precoding to gain more insights into the proposed system3:
ak =
hˆk
‖hˆk‖
, for k ∈ K. (5)
Meanwhile, at the receiver side, without loss of generality,
we assume that the received signal of each user is normalized
by
√
pdβkM for k ∈ K. Then, the normalized received signal
vector for Bob is given by
rk =
(
hTk ak√
M
)
qk +
∑
` 6=k
(
hTk a`√
M
)
q` + zk for k, ` ∈ K,
(6)
where zk is an Nd × 1 zero-mean CSCG noise vector with
covariance matrix (pdβkM)−1IN . We define an effective
downlink channel gain (EDCG) from Alice to Bob as gk =
1√
M
hTk ak which leads to the following simplified expression
of rk:
rk = gkqk + nk for k ∈ K, (7)
where nk =
∑
` 6=k(
hTk a`√
M
)qk + zk. In Appendix A, we show
that hTk a` for k 6= ` follows CN (0, 1). Thus, the last term, nk
follows CN (0Nd , σ2nkINd) where
σ2nk =
1
M
(
K − 1 + 1
pdβk
)
. (8)
Following a similar approach, we have the normalized
received signal vector for Eve as
rek =
(
hek
Tak√
M
)
qk +
∑
` 6=k
(
hek
Ta`√
M
)
q` for k, ` ∈ K. (9)
Note that no noise is assumed in the normalized received
signal vector for Eve, which leads to an unfavorite scenario
to Bob and Alice. Thus, the sum of interference due to the
downlink signals to the other users is only the factor to impair
recovering qk from rek. In addition, the assumption allows us
not to care for the the locations of the eavesdroppers. The
received signal at Eve, rek can also be simplified to
rek = g
e
kqk + n
e
k for k ∈ E , (10)
3In general, two linear precoding schemes, MF and MMSE precoding
methods, are of practical interest [43]. Our main results are also valid with
the MMSE precoding, but its complicated expression may make it harder to
understand essentials.
where gek =
1√
M
hek
Tak is the EDCG from Alice to Eve,
and nek =
∑
k 6=`(
hek
T a`√
M
)q` whose distribution is given by
CN (0Nd , σ2ne,kINd) with σ2ne,k = (K − 1)/M . In Fig. 1(b),
the received signals rk and rek at Bob and Eve, respectively,
are depicted as the results of the CRS.
C. Information Reconciliation and Privacy Amplification
After the CRS, secret keys are extracted from the shared
randomness through the information reconciliation and privacy
amplification phases, which requires knowledge of informa-
tion leakage to eavesdroppers by the PCA. However, we
assume that Alice and the K users have no information about
eavesdroppers. In this section, we first review the information
reconciliation and privacy amplification phases shown in Fig.
1(b) and then discuss how such missing information hinders
the phases from generating secret keys.
In the information reconciliation phase, Alice sends parity
bits over an authenticated public channel to the users who
need to correct errors occurred in the CRS. In the CRS,
Alice transmits to Bob a sequence qk that arrives at Bob
and Eve who have received sequences rk = (rk,1, . . . , rk,Nd)
and rek = (r
e
k,1, . . . , r
e
k,Nd
), respectively. After the randomness
sharing, Alice and Bob can have shared information which
amounts to I(Qk; Rk) where Qk and Rk are random vectors
corresponding to the realizations qk and rk, respectively.
The uncertainty between Qk and Rk must be resolved to
make them identical in the information reconciliation phase.
According to the Slepian-Wolf theorem [45], the information
reconciliation requires at least νk = H(Qk|Rk) = H(Qk)−
I(Qk; Rk) bit exchanges over the public channel. While either
Alice or Bob can generate and transmit the parity bits, this
work assumes that Alice sends the parity bits since Alice
already has the estimated CSI. Then, Alice and Bob can have
an identical sequence, qk which turns into the binary sequence,
bk of length Nb = H(Qk). However, the sequence is not
secure from eavesdropping due to the information leakage,
denoted by Ek, during the first two phases, i.e. the CRS and
information reconciliation phases. Alice and Bob extract a
secret key from Qk by performing the privacy amplification
process which eliminates the amount of eavesdropped infor-
mation, Ek, from H(Qk). This can be done by using a hash
function, Gk ∈ G : {0, 1}Nb → {0, 1}sk , randomly chosen
from a family of universal hash functions, G [46] where sk is
the length of secret key, Sk. If we determine sk such that
sk = [Nd{I(Qk;Rk)− I(Qk;Rek)} − 2ak − 2− bk]+ ,
(11)
where Qk and Rek are the i.i.d. random variables representing
the components in the random vectors, Qk and Rek, respec-
tively, it is guaranteed that, for a sufficiently large Nd, the
eavesdropper’s uncertainty about the secret key, denoted by
H(Sk|Gk,Ek), is bounded by
H(Sk|Gk,Ek) ≥ sk − 2
−bk
ln 2
with probability 1− 2−ak .
(12)
6By appropriately choosing ak and bk, we can obtain a suffi-
ciently long secret key with the eavesdropper’s uncertainty that
can be arbitrarily close to sk, which implies perfect secrecy.
However, the standard sequential SKA protocol cannot be
directly applied to our scenario due to the assumption, i.e no
prior knowledge about the eavesdroppers. In particular, the
problems are as follows:
1) Unknown νk: The required νk for the information recon-
ciliation is derived from I(Qk;Rk) which is a function
of CSI between Alice and Bob. However, once the
training sequence sent by Bob is contaminated by the
PCA, Alice would have a poor estimate of the CSI,
and its corresponding νk may not be enough for Bob
to decode qk.
2) Unknown I(Qk;Rek): Due to unknown CSI between Al-
ice and Eve, Alice and Bob cannot measure I(Qk;Rek).
Thus, the standard sequential SKA protocol cannot de-
termine the length of secret key in (11) to achieve perfect
secrecy.
The first problem of unknown νk can be resolved by
exchanging additional messages between Alice and Bob. For
example, if a rateless Slepian-Wolf code is employed, Alice
can repeatedly send additional parity bits to Bob until Bob has
a sufficiently large number of parity bits to make rk identical
to qk and sends an acknowledge message to Alice. In this case,
although a certain amount of overhead is inevitable, the rate-
less Slepian-Wolf codes can be a practical solution since they
do not require instantaneous CSI between a transmitter and
a receiver. Thus, throughout this paper, we assume that Bob
can perfectly recover qk using a rateless Slepian-Wolf code.
The practical design and optimization of rateless Slepian-Wolf
codes are presented in [47], [48].
However, unknown I(Qk;Rek) is still problematic. Since the
eavesdroppers will not reveal their presence and information
about the PCA, a mechanism must be introduced into the pro-
posed scheme to estimate I(Qk;Rek), which is realized in this
work by taking advantage of a trace left by the eavesdropper
during the PCA. To be precisely, Bob is suspicious of the PCA
if its received signal strength unexpectedly drops during the
CRS. Then, Bob can estimate I(Qk;Rek) by comparing the
received signal strength with its expectation. As depicted in
Fig. 1(b), the estimation results, denoted by gˆek, are provided
to the privacy amplification, which in the end generates secret
keys as the final results of the proposed SKA protocol. The
details of the proposed method will be introduced and analyzed
in the following sections.
Before finishing this section, a few practical issues should
be discussed. In fast fading environments, the proposed SKA
protocol may result in a considerable overhead to establish
a secret key at a sufficiently long length. In such a case,
there might be a trade-off between the data throughput and
key renewal rate for a given secret key length. In addition, an
unexpected drop of the received signal strength can happen due
to user mobility or sudden environment changes, which may
introduce a false alarm and thus degrade the performance of
the proposed SKA protocol, i.e. the average secret key length.
III. ESTIMATION OF INFORMATION LEAKAGE
In this section, we first investigate an inevitable comple-
mentary relation between SINR’s at Bob and Eve, i.e. the
increase of SINR at one party must result in the decrease of
SINR at the other. Based on this complementary relation, we
propose an estimator of the EDCG from Alice to Eve (i.e. gek),
which allows us to estimate the information leakage to Eve,
I(Qk;R
e
k). The crucial complementary relation also promises
a better estimation result for a stronger PCA.
A. The Impact of PCA on Average SINRs
The average SINRs at Bob and Eve, denoted by SINRk and
SINRek, are defined as
SINRk = E[(gkqk)†(gkqk)]/(NdE[n†knk]), and
SINRek = E[(gekqk)†(gekqk)]/(NdE[nek
†nek]).
Then, the average SINRs are derived in the following result.
Theorem 1: When Bob and Eve receive the signals in (7)
and (10), respectively, their SINR’s are given by
SINRk =
Mck + w
2
kck + 1
(1 + (1 + w2k)ck)(K − 1 + 1pdβk )
and (13)
SINRek =
Mw2kck + ck + 1
(1 + (1 + w2k)ck)(K − 1)
. (14)
Proof: See Appendix B.
Remark 1: By letting wk → 0, the results in Theorem 1
turn into the ones for passive eavesdropping. Then, we have
SINRk = Mck+1(1+ck)(K−1+ 1pdβk )
and SINRek = (K − 1)−1, which
shows that SINRk grows with the number of antennas, M .
On the other hand, SINRek does not depend on M . Thus, the
length of secret key can be increased by employing more
antennas at Alice under the passive eavesdropping. While
similar results can be found in [24]–[26], the results in the
work are different from the previous ones in that the signals
for the other K−1 users in our model act as interference and
preclude the eavesdropper from taking information.
The ratio of SINR’s at Bob and Eve is readily approximated
as γk = SINRk/SINRek ≈ 1/w2k when K  1 and M  1.
The ratio clearly shows that the SINR at Bob is inversely
proportional to the effective strength of the PCA, wk, which
leads to a better SINR at Eve. While the results in Theorem
1 describe the average behavior of SINR, the instantaneous
amount of information leakage in each SKA protocol is not
provided. In the next subsection, bearing the complementary
relation in mind, we will derive an estimator of the EDCG
from Alice to Eve, which in turn gives us an instantaneous
estimate of the information leakage to eavesdroppers.
B. Estimation of Eavesdropper’s Channel
According to (9), the amount of information leaked to
Eve, I(Qk;Rek), is readily found by Bob when the EDCG
from Alice to Eve, gek is known to Bob. To this end, in this
subsection, we derive an estimator for gek. The estimation of g
e
k
is carried out by fulfilling a series of estimations: 1) maximum-
likelihood estimation (MLE) for wk 2) MMSE estimation for
7gk, and 3) MMSE estimation for gek, where their estimates are
denoted by wˆk, gˆk, and gˆek, respectively. The estimation results
from the first two steps are used as unknown parameters in
the estimations of gek.
The main idea behind the proposed estimator is to ex-
ploit the complementary relation between the received signal
strengths at Bob and Eve, which results in an unexpected drop
of signal strength at the target user when the PCA is attempted
to Bob. The difference between the received signal strengths
and his expectation will be used to estimate gek. However, the
CSI of the channel from Alice to Bob is unknown to Bob and
thus he does not know his expected signal strength. To resolve
this issue, as shown in Fig. 1(b), Alice sends side information
ζk = ‖yk‖ for k ∈ K, i.e. the strengths of her received signals
right after the information reconciliation phase.
1) Estimation of wk: With the side information ζk and the
normalized received signal vector at Bob in (6), we can derive
the MLE, wˆk, as
wˆk = arg max
wk
f(rk|qk, ζk;wk), (15)
where qk is given by the information reconciliation using a
rateless Slepian-Wolf code. The pdf f(rk|qk, ζk;wk) in (15)
can be factorized as
f(rk|qk, ζk;wk)
=
∫
f(rk|qk, ζk, gk;wk)f(gk|qk, ζk;wk)dgk
(a)
=
∫
f(rk|qk, gk;wk)f(gk|ζk;wk)dgk, (16)
where (a) is due to the facts that rk is independent of wk and
ζk for a given gk, and gk is independent of qk.
Note that finding wˆk by substituting (16) into (15) requires
an exhaustive search as there is no closed-form solution.
It may be impractical to find the estimate by performing
numerical integrations, especially when the users suffer from
limited computing power and/or power resources. Thus, we
approximate the MLE of wk by taking one of the key features
of systems with LAA, i.e. the randomness caused by fading
and noise vanishes as the number of antennas increases [22],
[23]. The following theorem describes the asymptotic behavior
of gk as M →∞.
Theorem 2: Under the PCA with wk, as M increases, gk
converges to µgk =
√
ck
1+(1+w2k)ck
ζk√
M
in probability for a given
ζk.
Proof: See Appendix C.
Thus, by applying Theorem 2 to (16), we have
f(rk|qk, gk;wk) → f(rk|qk, µgk ;wk) in probability for a
large M . This result allows us to have a simpler MLE
of wk. That is, the value of wk for which the derivative
of f(rk|qk, µgk ;wk) with respect to wk is equal to zero
corresponds to wˆk. After some manipulations, we obtain a
closed form expression for wˆk as
wˆk =
√√√√√√
 ζk
r†kqk
q†kqk
√
ckM
−
(
1 +
1
ck
)
+
. (17)
2) Estimation of gk: The MMSE estimator for gk, i.e. gˆk =
E [gk|rk,qk, ζk;wk] can be derived as
gˆk =
r†kqk + σ
2
nk
µgk/σ
2
gk
q†kqk + σ2nk/σ
2
gk
. (18)
The details of the derivation are given in Appendix E.
3) Estimation of gek: The MMSE estimator for g
e
k is ob-
tained by taking the conditional expectation of gek given the
known parameters, rk, qk, and ζk [43]. That is, gˆek is given
by
gˆek = E[gek|rk,qk, ζk;wk], (19)
which is derived in the following theorem.
Theorem 3: For given rk, qk, and ζk, the MMSE estimator
for gek is given by
gˆek =
wkck
1 + w2kck
(
ζk√
ckM
− gˆk
)
, (20)
where gˆk is the MMSE estimate of gk in (18).
Proof: From (19), we can find gˆek by conducting a serious
of decomposition as follows:
gˆek =
∫
gekf(g
e
k|rk,qk, ζk;wk)dgek
=
∫
gek
∫
f(gek, gk|rk,qk, ζk;wk)dgkdgek
=
∫
gek
∫
f(gek|gk, rk,qk, ζk;wk)
f(gk|rk,qk, ζk;wk)dgkdgek
(a)
=
∫
gek
∫
f(gek|gk, ζk;wk)f(gk|rk,qk, ζk;wk)dgkdgek
(b)
=
∫ [∫
gekf(g
e
k|gk, ζk;wk)dgek
]
f(gk|rk,qk, ζk;wk)dgk
(c)
=
wkck
1 + w2kck
(
ζk√
ckM
− E [gk|rk,qk, ζk;wk]
)
, (21)
where (a) is from the fact that gek is independent of rk and
qk for given gk and ζk, (b) is from the Fubini’s theorem that
allows us to change the order of integration, (c) is from the
fact that
∫
gekf(g
e
k|gk, ζk;wk)dgek = µc derived in Appendix
D.
Remark 2: The expression for gˆek in (20) shows that the
estimator exploits the complementary relation as expected.
That is, Bob first tries to estimate gk, and then gek by comparing
the estimate of gk with its expected value, ζk√ckM . Thus, for a
given ζk, the smaller gˆk Bob has, the larger gˆek the estimator
produces. In the end, the PCA is detected with the higher
probability. It should be noted that while we do not discuss in
this work, a detector can be derived with the result in (20)
with which the shared random sequence can be discarded
when eavesdropping is detected as the BB84 protocol does.
In the evaluations of the gˆek, the unknown parameter wk will
be replaced with the estimated one, wˆk in (17).
In Section IV, the performances of the proposed estimator
in (20) will be evaluated in terms of the MSE [43] which is
derived in this subsection. Let us first rewrite the estimate of
gk as gˆk = gk − ek,1, where ek,1 is the MMSE estimation
8error of gˆk. Then, the MMSE estimator for gek in (20) can be
rewritten as
gˆek =
wkck
1 + w2kck
(
ζk√
ckM
− gk + ek,1
)
(a)
= E[gek|ζk, gk] +
wkck
1 + w2kck
ek,1
= gek − ek,2 +
wkck
1 + w2kck
ek,1 = g
e
k − ek,2 + e′k,1, (22)
where (a) is due to the fact that the conditional mean value
of gek for given gk and ζk is
wkck
1+w2kck
( ζk√
ckM
− gk) as shown
in Appendix D, and ek,2 is defined as the MMSE estimation
error of gek when gk is perfectly known to Bob. Thus, the MSE
of gˆek becomes
E[|gˆek − gek|2;wk]
= E[|ek,2|2] + E[|e′k,1|2]− 2E[<{ek,2e′k,1}]
(a)
= E[|ek,2|2] +
(
wkck
1 + w2kck
)2
E[|ek,1|2],
where (a) is from the facts that ek,2 is independent of ek,1,
and E[ek,i] = 0 for i = 1, 2 since the MMSE estimation error
is Gaussian with zero mean [43], [44]. Note that E[|ek,2|2]
and E[|ek,1|2] correspond to the conditional variances of
gek and gk with respect to the pdfs f(g
e
k|ζk, gk;wk) and
f(gk|rk,qk, ζk;wk), respectively, which are derived in Ap-
pendices D and E, respectively. Then, the MSE of gˆek is finally
given by
E[|gˆek − gek|2;wk]
=
1
(1 + w2kck)M
+
(
wkck
1 + w2kck
)2 σ2gkσ2nk
σ2gkq
†
kqk + σ
2
nk
=
1
M

1
1 + w2kck
+
(
wkck
1+w2kck
)2
q†kqk(
K−1+ 1pdβk
) + 1+(1+w2k)ck
1+w2kck
 , (23)
where σ2nk is taken from (8). The MSE in (23) looks inversely
proportional to the number of antennas, M .
Remark 3: Before closing this sub-section, it should be
noted that Alice can also transmit downlink pilot signals which
may help Bob to estimate the EDCGs, gk, and gek. Such a two-
way training strategy [49], [50] is especially helpful under fast
fading environments where the length of random sequence qk
is limited due to the short coherence time interval. Since the
proposed scheme estimates the EDCGs based on the random
sequence qk, the limited length of random sequence results
in poor estimates of gk and gek. In such a case, it may be
beneficial to allocate a portion of the downlink transmission
to the downlink pilot signals, which significantly improves the
estimates. While the two-way training strategy reduces the
length of random sequence, the better estimates of EDCGs
may offset the decrease of the length of the random sequence.
Thus, by carefully allocating the downlink transmission to the
pilot signals and random sequence, a longer secret key may
be achievable. As another practical issue, we may need to
consider that while this work assumes the perfect channel
reciprocity, the uplink and downlink channels may change
during the key sharing process, which increases the channel
estimate error. The analysis with the channel variation can
be conducted by modifying the derivations for the estimation
errors derived in this section.
C. Secret Key Generation
We can now estimate I(Qk;Rek) in (11) by replacing the
true value of gek with its estimate, gˆ
e
k derived in the previous
subsection. Let us denote the estimate of I(Qk;Rek) based on
gˆek by I(Qk; Rˆ
e
k) with which the length of secret key is now
adaptively determined as
sˆk = [Nd{I(Qk;Rk)− I(Qk; Rˆek)} − 2ak − 2− bk]+ (24)
= [Nd{H(Qk|Rˆek)−H(Qk|Rk)} − 2ak − 2− bk]+
≥ [Nd{H(Qk|Rˆek)− νk} − 2ak − 2− bk]+, (25)
where Rˆek = gˆ
e
kQk+Nk is the output from an AWGN channel
with gain gˆek and Gaussian noise Nk, and νk ≥ H(Qk|Rk)
is the number of parity bits exchanged in the information
reconciliation phase. Later in the performance evaluations, we
assume that νk equals H(Qk|Rk), and the equality holds in
(25). However, the estimation error in gˆek may result in an un-
derestimate of I(Qk;Rek). According to (12), a secrecy outage
occurs when the true value of gek is greater than its estimate, gˆ
e
k.
In this case, Alice and Bob fail to make the generated secret
key completely secure from the eavesdropping. To analyze
how often the proposed SKA protocol causes the outage event,
we evaluate the secrecy outage probability, i.e Pr(|gˆek| < |gek|).
We introduce to the SKA protocol a design parameter called
a secrecy margin, δ ∈ [0,∞) to compensate for the estimation
error in gˆek and define an outage event as
S = {|gek|2 | (1 + δ)2|gˆek|2 < |gek|2}. (26)
Then, for given wk and δ, the secrecy outage probability is
expressed as
Pout(rk,qk, ζk;wk, δ)
=
∫
|gek|2∈S
f(|gek|2|rk,qk, ζk;w)d|gek|2. (27)
Meanwhile, the secrecy margin turns Rˆek into Rˆ
e
k = (1 +
δ)gˆekQk + Nk, which decreases the secret key length, sˆk in
(24) at the expense of the outage probability.
Since the pdf f(gek|rk,qk, ζk;wk) follows CN (µgˆek , σ2gˆek)
as shown in Appendix D, the conditional pdf
f(|gek|2|rk,qk, ζk;wk) in (27) follows a Rice distribution.
Thus, we can simply express Pout(rk,qk, ζk;wk, δ) in (27)
as
Pout(rk,qk, ζk;wk, δ)
= Q1
(√
2|µgˆek |2
σ2gˆek
,
√
2|(1 + δ)gˆek|2
σ2gˆek
)
, (28)
where Q1(a, b) =
∫∞
b
x exp
(
−x2+a22
)
I0(ax)dx is the first
order generalized Marcum Q-function, and I0(·) is the zero-
th order modified Bessel function. By averaging the secrecy
outage probability in (28) with respect to the joint pdf
9f(rk,qk, ζk;wk), the average secrecy outage probability is
given by
P¯out(wk, δ) = E[Pout(rk,qk, ζk;wk, δ)]. (29)
To get more insightful results, we introduce to (28) an upper
bound
Q1(a, b) ≤ exp
[
− (b− a)
2
2
]
, (30)
for a ≤ b [51], [52]. Then, the average secrecy outage
probability is also bounded as
P¯out(wk, δ) ≤ E
[
exp
{
−
(|(1 + δ)gˆek| − |µgˆek |)2
σ2gˆek
}]
. (31)
Now, it is much easier to investigate into asymptotic behaviors
of the average secrecy outage probability with the upper bound
in (31). That is, as M grows, the upper bounds in (31) turns
into
lim
M→∞
P¯out(wk, δ) (32)
≤ exp
− (1 + w2kck)Mδ2
1 +
w2kc
2
k
(
K−1+ 1pdβk
)
q†kqk(1+w
2
kck)+
(
K−1+ 1pdβk
)
{1+(1+w2k)ck}
 .
since gˆek → µgˆek in probability.
It can be noticed that the bound in (32) decreases exponen-
tially fast with M , which is possible due to the fact that Bob
can accurately adjust the length of extracting secret key as gˆek
gets close to gek with the growing number antennas. That is,
even if the beam is tilted toward Eve under the PCA, the LAA
is still helpful for Bob not only to eliminate the noise/fading
effects from the received signal but also to estimate the amount
of information leakage. In Section IV, we will analyze the
average secrecy outage probability with various combinations
of wk and δ.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS
In this section, we present performances of the proposed
SKA protocol in both numerical and analytic ways4. Through-
out the performance evaluations, we consider the following
system setup: the ratios of uplink and downlink transmit
powers (pu and pd, respectively) to the unit noise variance are
set to 10 dB and 20 dB, respectively. This asymmetric power
allocation is due to the practical consideration that the power at
the user side may be limited. For the downlink transmission,
we consider binary random sequences, i.e qk ∈ {−1, 1}Nd
for k ∈ K. While binary sequences are considered in this
work, the results can be readily extended to sequences with
larger alphabet symbols since all the derivations are in general
forms. The large scale fading factors, i.e. βk and βe` , are set
to one for all k, ` ∈ K. Finally, the number of symbols in
the uplink training sequences is assumed to be Nu = 100. For
the given setup, we will evaluate performances of the proposed
4Although we also perform Monte Carlo simulations, we do not present
the results in this paper as we confirm that our simulation results are exactly
the same to the numerical evaluations.
SKA protocol with various combinations of design parameters,
M , K, Nd, and δ and show how the parameters affect the
performances.
A. Estimation of gek
We first evaluate performances of the estimator gˆek in (20)
in terms of the normalized MSE (NMSE) defined as
NMSE =
E[(|gek − gˆek|)2]
E[|gek|2]
. (33)
As a reference, we consider the case that gk is perfectly known
to Bob. Then, the NMSE becomes
NMSEideal =
1
E[|gek|2]
1
(1 + w2kck)M
, (34)
since the perfect knowledge of gk makes ek,1 in (22) zero.
Thus, the ideal NMSE in (34) is a lower bound on the
NMSE of gˆek which is taken as a yardstick in the performance
evaluations. The NMSE evaluations are carried out with the
analytic expression of the MSE in (23) and the estimate of
wk in (17). To confirm the results, we also find an empirical
expectation for the NMSE by conducting the estimations of
gek and wk 10
5 times at each point in Figs. 2(a) and 2(b). The
evaluations from the two different approaches are completely
overlapped each other, which confirms the derivations in
Section III.
The evaluations of NMSE versus M at different combina-
tions of K and wk are depicted in Fig. 2(a) where the NMSE
decreases as either of M and wk increases as predicted by the
closed-form expression for the MSE in (23). The results in
Fig 2(a) imply that for a fixed number of antennas, M , Bob
achieves a better estimation of Eve’s channel gek when Eve
attempts a stronger attack, i.e. a larger PCA power w2k in hopes
of eavesdropping more information about the communication
between legitimate parties. On the other hand, the increase of
the number of users, K, induces more interference to Bob and
thus degrades the NMSE. In Fig. 2(b), the NMSE evaluations
are performed with respect to Nd at M = 500, which shows
the same trends as the ones in Fig. 2(a). It is also noticed that
the lower bound on NMSE looks independent of Nd, i.e. the
length of qk since Nd affects only the results of gˆk as shown
in (18), and the lower bound already assumes the true value
of gk. The results in Fig. 2(b) show that the performances of
gˆek eventually approaches the lower bounds as Nd increases
since the more samples provide the better degree of accuracy
in the estimation of gk [43], [44].
B. Average Secrecy Outage Probability
In this subsection, we present average secrecy outage prob-
ability of the proposed SKA protocol. As a performance
benchmark, we also plot the upper bound on P¯out(wk, δ) by
introducing another upper bound on the Marcum Q-function:
(28):
Q1(a, b)
≤ I0(ab)
exp(ab)
{
exp
[
− (b− a)
2
2
]
+ a
√
pi
2
erfc
(
b− a√
2
)}
,
(35)
10
100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
10−3
10−2
10−1
M
N
M
S
E
o
f
gˆ
e k
 
 
NMSE (K=100)
NMSE (K=10)
NMSE with known gkw2k = -10 dB
w2k = -3 dB
(a) NMSE of gˆek versus M when Nd = 1, 000.
100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
10−3
10−2
10−1
Nd
N
M
S
E
of
gˆ
e k
 
 
NMSE (K = 100)
NMSE (K = 10)
NMSE with known gk
w2k = -10 dB
w2k = -3 dB
(b) NMSE of gˆek versus Nd when M = 500.
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Fig. 3. Average secrecy outage probability, P¯out(wk, δ), with different parameters for a fixed δ = 0.1.
where erfc(x) = 1pi
∫∞
x
exp
(−t2) dt. Note that although the
bound in (35) is less insightful than that in (30), it provides a
tighter upper bound than that in (30) [51], [52].
Fig. 3 depicts the average secrecy outage probability,
P¯out(wk, δ), with respect to M and Nd for different values
of wk and K when δ = 0.1. The results in Fig. 3(a) show that
P¯out(wk, δ) decreases exponentially fast with M as expected
from (32). It is also observed that a lower P¯out(wk, δ) is
achievable as wk increases, i.e. a stronger PCA, which is due
to the fact that a larger wk allows the proposed estimator
gˆek to have a smaller MSE as derived in (23), and thereby
we can reduce the occurrence of secrecy outage events. The
secrecy outage probability also decreases as Nd increases as
shown in Fig. 3(b), which is due to a better estimate of gk as
observed in Fig. 2(b). For a large Nd, P¯out(wk, δ) eventually
converges to an certain value which corresponds to the average
outage probability when the true value of gk is revealed to the
estimator of gek.
We now see trade-off relations among different parameters,
M , K, Nd, and δ, in the average secrecy outage probability by
investigating the contour plots of P¯out(wk, δ) in Fig. 4 where
w2k is set to −6dB. The results provide a useful reference that
enables system designers to select appropriate combinations of
system parameters to meet various system requirements. The
results in Fig. 4(a) show that the number of antennas M must
be almost linearly increased to compensate for the growing
number of users K to achieve a target average secrecy outage
probability. The tradeoff between M and K is due to the
results in (32) where the exponent is inversely proportional to
M/K for a large Nd. The average secrecy outage probability
is also analyzed with respect to M and Nd in Fig. 4(b) where
it is observed that the performance loss caused by employing a
smaller size of the LAA can be compensated for by increasing
Nd to some extent and vice versa. However, as noticed in Fig.
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(b) Contour plot of P¯out(wk, δ) versus M and Nd when K = 100 and
δ = 0.1.
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(c) Contour plot of P¯out(wk, δ) versus M and δ when K = 100 and
Nd = 1, 000.
Fig. 4. Contour plot of P¯out(wk, δ) when w2k = −6 dB
4(b) the impact of Nd on P¯out(wk, δ) is saturated fast with
growing Nd. Thus, increasing M is a more effective way to
reduce P¯out(wk, δ) when Nd is already large enough. Finally,
we see the variations of average secrecy outage probability
with respect to the secrecy margin, δ in Fig. 4(c) where it is
observed that a small change of δ can exert a large influence on
P¯out(wk, δ) since the average outage probability is decreases
exponentially fast with respect to the square of the secrecy
margin as shown in (32). However, it should be noted that the
smaller outage probability is achieved at the expense of the
secret key length. We will discuss this issue in detail in the
next subsection.
C. Average Length of Extracting Secret Key
In this subsection, we evaluate the average length of secret
key in (24) with respect to different values of M and δ when
Nd = 1, 000 and w2k = −6 dB. Note that ak and bk in (24)
become negligible for a sufficiently large Nd [53]. Hence, for
simplicity, we only evaluate Rs(wk, δ) = E{[I(Qk;Rk) −
I(Qk; Rˆ
e
k)]
+}, where the expectation is taken over the joint
pdf of f(rk,qk, ζk;wk). We also evaluate the average secret
key length when the eavesdropper’s channel, gek is perfectly
known to Bob, Rs(wk) = E{[I(Qk;Rk) − I(Qk;Rek)]+} as
a performance benchmark, which elucidates the performance
loss due to the error in the estimation of gek.
The average secret key lengths Rs(wk, δ) and average
secrecy outage probabilities P¯out(w, δ) are evaluated in Figs.
5(a) and 5(b), respectively, with respect to M for different
values of K and δ. It is noticed that there exists a fundamental
trade-off between Rs(wk, δ) and P¯out(wk, δ). That is, if we
increase δ to achieve a lower P¯out(w, δ), we have accordingly
a smaller Rs(wk, δ). We can also observe that Rs(wk, δ) with
δ = 0 achieves almost the same performance of Rs(wk) in
Fig. 5(a). This result implies that the proposed estimator gˆek
produces an estimate very close to its true value, gek. However,
in Fig. 5(b), the corresponding P¯out(wk, δ) approaches almost
12
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
M
R
s
(w
k
,δ
)
 
 
Rs with knwon gek
Rs(wk,δ ), δ = 0
Rs(wk,δ ), δ = 0.05
Rs(wk,δ ), δ = 0.1
Rs(wk,δ ), δ = 0.15
Rs(wk,δ ), δ = 0.2
K = 10
K = 100
(a) Rs(wk, δ) versus M .
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
M
¯ P
o
u
t
(w
k
,δ
)
 
 
K = 100
K = 10
δ = 0
δ = 0.05
δ = 0.1
δ = 0.15
δ = 0.2
(b) P¯out(wk, δ) versus M with different δ.
Fig. 5. Rs(wk, δ) and P¯out(wk, δ) with respect to M for Nd = 1, 000 and w2k = −6 dB.
0.5. Note that the estimation result from the MMSE estimator
for gek follows a Gaussian distribution [43], [44], and thus |gˆek|
follows a Rician distribution. While the Rician distribution is
not symmetric with respect to its true value gek, it becomes
symmetric as M increases. Thus, for all sufficiently large
M , Pout = Pr(|gˆek| < |gek|) = Pr(|gˆek| ≥ |gek|) = 0.5.
However, for some small M values, the asymmetry of the
Rician distribution makes Pout larger than 0.5 as shown in Fig.
5(b). However, the results in (31) tell that P¯out(w, δ) decreases
exponentially fast with increasing δ, and thus a small sacrifice
of Rs(wk, δ) is well paid off by a significant improvement of
P¯out(w, δ).
In Fig. 5(a), it is also noticed that Rs(wk, δ) has a peak after
which Rs(wk, δ) decreases with growing M . This happens due
to the fact that both I(Qk;Rk) and I(Qk;Rek) can not exceed
1 bit per channel-use (bpcu) and are proportional to the size
of the LAA as expected from (13). Thus, as M grows, the
Rs(wk, δ) has a maximum value and later becomes diminished
as both I(Qk;Rk) and I(Qk;Rek) approach 1 bpcu.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We studied an SKA protocol with LAA for a multi-user
TDD system in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers at-
tempting the PCA. By exploiting the complementary relation
between the received signal strengths at the eavesdropper and
its target user, an estimator was derived to measure the EDCG
from the BS to the eavesdropper. From an estimated EDCG,
the amount of information leakage was quantified, which was
used to adaptively adjust the length of extract secret key.
Extensive performance evaluations have been carried out in
both numerical and analytic ways. We showed that even in
the case that the eavesdropper can manipulate the LAA by the
PCA, we can still take advantage of the LAA in the estimator
and extract a certain length of secret keys with an arbitrary
low secrecy outage probability. As future research directions,
we will study a coordinated protocol to detect the PCA in
a multi-cell scenario, where the reuse of the same training
sequence across cells can be mis-identified as the PCA. In
addition, the research will further proceed to the cases when
the channels between legitimate parities and eavesdropper are
correlated, multiple antennas are employed in eavesdroppers,
and the channel reciprocity does not hold due to the channel
variations over time for practical considerations.
APPENDIX A
Consider two M × 1 independent random vectors x =
[x1, · · · , xM ]T and y = [y1, · · · , yM ]T that are zero-mean
CSCG with covariance matrices σ2xIM and σ
2
yIM , respec-
tively. Then, the m-th component of y can be rewritten by
ym = rme
jφm for m = 1, · · · ,M where rm ∈ [0,∞) and
φm ∈ [−pi, pi) follow Rayleigh and uniform distributions,
respectively. Then, it can be shown
t = x†
y
‖y‖ = x˜1r˜1 + · · ·+ x˜M r˜M ,
where x˜m = xmejφm and r˜m = rm√
r21+···+r2M
. Note that
x˜m has the same distribution as xm due to the circularly-
symmetric property. The pdf of t is given by
f(t) =
∫
f(t|r˜)f(r˜)dr˜
(a)
=
∫
1
piσ2x
∑M
m=1 r˜
2
m
exp
(
− t
2
σ2x
∑M
m=1 r˜
2
m
)
f(r˜)dr˜
(b)
=
1
piσ2x
exp
(
− t
2
σ2x
)
,
where (a) is due to the fact that t can be seen as the summation
of independent complex Gaussian random variables {x˜m} for
given r˜ = [r˜1, · · · , r˜M ]T , and (b) is due to the fact that∑M
m=1 r˜
2
m = 1.
APPENDIX B
Since we normalize the average power of qk to one, we have
SINRk =
E[|gk|2]
σ2nk
that is determined by the distribution of gk.
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Based on the orthogonality principle of the MMSE estimation
[43], [44], we can rewrite gk as follows:
gk =
h†kak√
M
(a)
=
(hˆk + ek)
†
√
M
hˆk
||hˆk||
, (36)
where (a) is from ak = ykζk =
hˆk
||hˆk|| , and ek is the estimation
error of the MMSE estimation. Note that we have hˆk ∼
CN (0M , ck1+(1+w2k)ck IM ) and ek ∼ CN (0M ,
1+w2kck
1+(1+w2k)ck
IM )
from the MMSE property [43], [44]. Then, gk in (36) can be
rewritten by
gk =
1√
M
(
||hˆk||+ e†k
hˆk
||hˆk||
)
(a)
=
1√
M
(
||hˆk||+ ek
)
,
where (a) is from Appendix A, and ek ∼ CN (0, 1+w
2
kck
1+(1+w2k)ck
).
We notice that due to the orthogonality principle of the
MMSE estimation, we have E[||hˆk||ek] = 0. Thus, we have
E[|gk|2] = 1ME[|||hˆk|| + ek|2] = 1ME[||hˆk||2] + 1ME[|ek|2].
Since both hˆk and ek follow the complex Gaussian dis-
tribution, we have E[||hˆk||2] = ck2{1+(1+w2k)ck}E[X
2
2M ] and
E[|ek|2] = 1+w
2
kck
2{1+(1+w2k)ck}
E[X 22 ], where X 2m is a chi-square
random variable with m degrees of freedom whose first
order moment is E[X 2m] = m. Thus, we have E[|gk|2] =
ck
1+(1+w2k)ck
+
1+w2kck
M{1+(1+w2k)ck}
=
Mck+w
2
kck+1
M{1+(1+w2k)ck}
. Then, from
(8), we finally have
SINRk =
Mck + w
2
kck + 1
(1 + (1 + w2k)ck)(K − 1 + 1pdβk )
.
We omit the derivation of SINRek since we can derive SINR
e
k
in the same manner.
APPENDIX C
Let us first find the asymptotic behavior of f(gk|ζk;w).
In Appendix D, we have f(gk|ζk;w) ∼ CN (µgk , σ2gk). It is
obvious that limM→∞ σ2gk = 0, while the limiting value of
µgk is given by
lim
M→∞
µgk = lim
M→∞
ζk√
M
{ √
ck
1 + (1 + w2k)ck
}
= lim
M→∞
1√
M
√∑M
m=1
|ykm|2
{ √
ck
1 + (1 + w2k)ck
}
(a)
=
√
ck
1 + (1 + w2k)ck
, (37)
where ykm is the m-th component of yk, and (a) is from the
law of large numbers that, as M goes to infinity, the sample
variance of random variable converges to its true variance.
Therefore, for a given ζk, gk → µgk in probability as M →∞.
Then, the asymptotic behavior of f(gk;wk) for a large M is
given by
lim
M→∞
f(gk;wk)
= lim
M→∞
∫
f(gk|ζk;wk)f(ζk;wk)dζk
(a)
=
∫
lim
M→∞
f(gk|ζk;wk)f(ζk;wk)dζk
(b)
=
√
ck
1 + (1 + w2k)ck
in probability,
where (a) is due to the Lebesgue dominated convergence
theorem, and (b) is from (37).
APPENDIX D
In this Appendix, we derive various pdfs used in this paper5.
A. pdfs of f(gk|ζk;wk) and f(gek|ζk;wk)
We first derive the pdf of f(gk|ζk;wk). To obtain
f(gk|ζk;wk), we first derive f(hk|yk;wk) using the Baye’s
theorem, which is given by
f(hk|yk;wk) = f(yk|hk;wk)f(hk)
f(yk;wk)
, (38)
where, from (2), we have f(yk|hk;wk) ∼
CN (√ckhk, (1 + w2kck)IM ), f(hk) ∼ CN (0M , IM ),
and f(yk;wk) ∼ CN (0M ,
(
1 + ck + w
2
kck
)
IM ). After
some manipulations, we can derive the conditional pdf of
f(hk|yk;wk) from (38) as follows:
f(hk|yk;wk) ∼ CN
( √
ck
1 + ck + w2kck
yk,
1 + w2kck
1 + ck + w2kck
IM
)
.
Note that gk = hTk ak/
√
M is the sum of scaled Gaussian
random variables for a given yk since ak becomes constant
for a given yk. Then, we have f(gk|yk;wk) ∼ CN (µgk , σ2gk),
where
µgk =
√
ck
1 + ck + w2kck
‖yk‖√
M
and σ2gk =
1 + w2kck
(1 + ck + w2kck)M
.
Finally, f (gk| ‖yk‖ ;wk) is derived from f (gk|yk;wk) as
follows:
f (gk|yk;wk) = f (gk|yk, ‖yk‖ ;wk)
(a)
= f (gk| ‖yk‖ ;wk) ,
where (a) is due to the fact that µgk and σ
2
gk
are in-
dependent of yk for a given ‖yk‖. In the same manner,
we have f(gek|ζk;wk) ∼ CN (µgek , σ2gek), where µgek =
wk
√
ck
(1+ck+w2kck)M
ζk√
M
and σ2gek =
1+ck
(1+ck+w2kck)M
.
5Throughout this paper, we do not include all details of the derivation if it
involves simple calculations.
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B. pdf of f(gek|gk, ζk;wk)
We first derive the joint pdf of f(hek,hk,yk;wk). From the
Baye’s theorem, we have
f(hek,hk,yk;wk) = f(hk,yk|hek;wk)f(hek),
where
f(hk,yk|hek;wk)
∼ CN
([
0M wk
√
ckh
e
k
]
,
[ IM √ckIM√
ckIM (1+ck)IM
])
and f(hek) ∼ CN (0M , IM ).
Then, the conditional distribution of hek given hk and yk,
f(hek|hk,yk;wk), becomes also the multivariate normal dis-
tribution that can be directly obtained from f(hek,hk,yk;wk)
[54]. After some manipulations, we have f(hek|hk,yk;wk) ∼
CN (µ,Σ), where µ = wk
√
ck
1+w2kck
(
yk −√ckhk
)
and Σ =
1
1+w2kck
IM . Then, since gek =
(hek)
T ak√
M
, we can derive
f(gek|hk,yk;wk) from the transformation of the random vec-
tor as follows:
f(gek|hk,yk;wk)
∼ CN
(
wk
√
ck
1 + w2kck
(
ζk√
M
−√ckgk
)
,
1
(1 + w2kck)M
)
.
Note that, by substituting (4) into (5), we have ak = ykζk , which
provides f(gek|hk,yk;wk) = f (gek|hk,ak,yk, ζk;wk) =
f (gek|hk,ak, gk,yk, ζk;wk). Then, we finally have
f(gek|hk,yk;wk) = f(gek|gk, ζk;wk) since f(gek|hk,yk;wk)
is characterized by gk and ζk.
APPENDIX E
The MMSE estimator for gk is given by gˆk =
E [gk|rk,qk, ζk;wk] =
∫
gkf (gk|rk,qk, ζk;wk) dgk. Thus,
the mean value of f (gk|rk,qk, ζk;wk), denoted by µgˆk ,
is the MMSE estimator for gk. The distribution of
f (gk|rk,qk, ζk;wk) can be derived as follow:
f (gk|rk,qk, ζk;wk)
=
f (gk, rk|qk, ζk;wk)
f (rk|qk, ζk;wk)
=
f (rk|gk,qk;wk) f (gk|ζk;wk)∫
f (rk|gk,qk;wk) f (gk|ζk;wk) dgk . (39)
The pdf of f (gk|ζk;wk) in (39) is derived in Appendix D,
while the pdf of f (rk|gk,qk;wk) can be obtained from (7),
which is given by f (rk|gk,qk;wk) ∼ CN
(
gkqk, σ
2
nk
INd
)
.
Then, after some manipulations, we finally have the pdf of
f (gk|rk,qk, ζk;wk) ∼ CN (µgˆk , σ2gˆk), where
µgˆk =
r†kqk + σ
2
nk
µgk/σ
2
gk
q†kqk + σ2nk/σ
2
gk
and σ2gˆk =
σ2nkσ
2
gk
q†kqkσ2gk + σ
2
nk
.
Thus, the MMSE estimator for gk is given by gˆk =
r†kqk+σ
2
nk
µgk/σ
2
gk
q†kqk+σ
2
nk
/σ2gk
. In the same manner, we can derive the pdf
of f (gek|rk,qk, ζk;wk) ∼ CN (µgˆek , σ2gˆek), where
µgˆek =
wkck
1 + w2kck
(
ζk√
ckM
− r
†
kqk + σ
2
nk
µgk/σ
2
gk
q†kqk + σ2nk/σ
2
gk
)
and
σ2gˆek =
1
(1 + w2kck)M
+
(
wkck
1 + w2kck
)2 σ2gkσ2nk
σ2gkq
†
kqk + σ
2
nk
.
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